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INVENTORS AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS *
HOWARD I. FORMAN t
THE TITLE OF this Article readily suggests numerous topics for
discussion. Depending upon the breadth of one's interpreta-
tion, it could easily embrace every subject, every facet of patent
law. However, we do not intend to cover quite so wide a field.
Four or five principal points have been selected for consideration.
Before taking them up, however, a note of caution is in order: of
necessity, not every phase of a given subject, nor every important case
illustrative thereof, will be discussed.
I.
AGREEMENTS TO ASSIGN INVENTIONS.
Everyone who makes an invention may be classified as a hired
inventor if he is employed by someone to do research, development
and/or engineering work with the object, or at least with the pious
hope, of making some new and useful discovery. All others who are
not so employed, or who may be thus engaged but are self-employed,
may be termed independent inventors. Each one has his own peculiar
problems and relationships when it comes to assigning his inventions
to some other party.
A.
The Hired Inventor-Employee Agreements.
When reference is made to the hired inventor the general concept
is that of a full-time employee, usually of some company. Such an
employee generally executes an employment agreement which prescribes
his obligations to his employer with respect to inventions which may
be made by him during the employment period and often for some
period thereafter. In the absence of an employment agreement the
• A paper presented at the Patent Law Seminar, Villanova University School
of Law, November 18, 1957.
t Ph.D., LL.B.; Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States;
Patent Attorney, Rohm & Haas Company, Philadelphia, Pa. Author of PATENTS-
THEIR OWNERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (1957),
and numerous law review articles.
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INVENTORS AND RELATIONS WITH OTHERS
rights to inventions made by an employee are governed by the common
law pertaining to "shop rights." This rule of law is to the effect that
an employer automatically acquires a royalty-free right to use an
employee's invention which is made during the hours of employment
and at some expense to the employer, as by the use of the employer's
time, materials, facilities or other assistance.' Shop rights are equitable
rights created through the operation of law by which the employer is
compensated for his contribution to his employee's invention.2
A shop right is but a limited right to use an invention. In some
cases an employer may assert that he is entitled to more-to an assign-
ment of the entire right. In the absence of a specific agreement covering
the situation, there must be a showing from the nature of the employee's
duties and his relationships with his employer that the employee and
the employer expected the former's inventions to be assigned to the
latter. This might be called an implied contract to assign inventions.
This is not the easiest sort of thing to establish, although it has been
done on occasion. For one thing, no such contract can be asserted
against an employee who is not hired to invent, but who makes an
invention while assisting others who have been hired to invent. Cer-
tainly, employers, and employees too for that matter, are better advised
to rely upon a well-drafted contract which spells out the rights and duties
of both, than to chance the results of litigation based upon such a
showing.4
A formal employment agreement, it should be understood, may not
be the complete answer. Just as with other forms of contracts, it
certainly is no guarantee that there will be no disputes as to the meaning
of its terms. However, with the benefit of years of such experiences
and litigation history behind us, we can at least frame such contracts
with a reasonable assurance of the meaning which the courts will ascribe
to many, if not all, of their provisions. With such agreements, more-
over, settlements both in and out of the courts are more likely to be
1. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178 (1933) ; Hapgood v.
Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886) ; McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843);
Crom v. Cement Gun Co., 46 F. Supp. 403 (D. Del. 1942) ; Bowers v. Woodman, 59
F.2d 797 (D. Mass. 1932) ; McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396 (1878), aff'd,
18 Ct. Cl. 757 (1882).
2. Gate-Way, Inc. v. Hillgren, 82 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1949); Gemco Engi-
neering & Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 151 Ohio St. 95, 84 N.E. 2d 596 (1949).
3. E.g., Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 128 Fed. 444 (W.D. Pa. 1904) ; Wireless
Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E. 307 (1921)
Fuller & Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Bartlett, 68 Wis. 73, 31 N.W. 747 (1887).
4. See, United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933)
Thompson v. American Tobacco Co., 174 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1949); Kay-Scheerer
Corp. v. American Sterilizer Co., 5 F. Supp. 273, 276 (E.D. N.Y. 1932); Cahill v.
Regan, 4 App. Div. 2d 328, 165 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1957).
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accomplished with dispatch and satisfaction to one or even both parties,
since the written terms can be evaluated on their face and without
having first to determine what those terms were to which the parties
had agreed at the outset. I say "written terms" although, like most
contracts, oral agreements to assign inventions are just as valid and
specific performance will be enforced, if proved.5 The statute of frauds
does not apply to patent cases. Written or oral, let us consider some
of the basic elements in such contracts.
An employee agreement to assign inventions must be based upon
an actual and valuable consideration.6 Qualifying as such is considera-
tion of the type which appears in most valid contracts, although the
employment itself is sufficient, provided the invention in question is
encompassed by the nature or objectives of the work for which the
employee was hired.7 Except for fraud, the question of adequacy of
consideration cannot be raised by an employee even if the contract ap-
pears to be inequitable as to him.8 If an invention is made during the
course of actual employment, the agreement to assign will be enforce-
able even if there is indefiniteness as to the term of employment, so
that the employer was not bound to keep the employee for any specific
length of time and the employee was free to leave at any time.' Em-
ployee invention contracts with minors are enforceable with respect to
those inventions made during the course of employment but only if
they originated after he has attained his majority, providing there has
been no disaffirmance of the contract itself within a reasonable period
of time after having reached majority.'" Contracts to assign inventions,
whether by an employee or by an outside inventor, will survive the
death of the assignor."
So much for general considerations. Now let us look at some of
the more specific factors. Employment contracts, of necessity, must
deal with the assignment of inventions as yet unmade but which both
5. Bowen v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 36 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1929) ; Spears v. Willis,
151 N.Y. 443, 45 N.E. 849 (1897).
6. Dalzell v. Dueber Watchcase Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315 (1893) ; B. P. Lientz
Oil Furnace Co. v. Ward T. Barker, 10 U.S.P.Q. 203 (W.D. Mo. 1931); Whitcomb
v. Whitcomb, 85 Vt. 76, 81 Atl. 97 (1911).
7. Lindberg Machine Works v. Lindberg, 305 I1. App. 543, 27 N.E.2nd 565
(1940) ; Kleb v. Wallach, 6 App. Div. 583, 39 N.Y. Supp. 654 (1st Dep't 1896).
8. Bowen v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 36 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1929) ; Hulse v. Bonsack
Machine Co., 65 Fed. 864 (4th Cir. 1895); Briggs v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
92 N.J. Eq. 277, 114 Atl. 538 (1920).
9. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 Fed. 353 (9th Cir. 1927).
10. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Frankhanel, 49 F. Supp. 611 (D. Md. 1943).
11. Klauder-Weldon Dyeing Machine Co. v. Weldon, 166 App. Div. 415, 151 N.Y.
Supp. 1068 (3d Dep't 1915); Olds v. Ray-Dio-Ray Corp., 160 Wash. 35, 294 Pac.
579 (1930).
[VOL. 3: p. 300
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parties hope will be made in the future. Such contracts have been
attacked repeatedly, and their meaning and scope constantly are being
exposed to judicial review. This is particularly true with respect to
inventions which relate to the subject matter covered by an employment
agreement but which actually arise some time after the employment
relationship has ceased. Are contracts to assign future inventions
valid? The answer is a categorical "yes," 12 but there are certain
conditions to be observed. The same answer could be given to the
question whether a court ever would require assignment to a former
employer of an invention made after the employment has been ter-
minated.
The principal legal concern with such agreements is whether they
are contrary to public policy. The courts have held that they are not,
primarily because the employee is not limited or restricted in his efforts
to earn a living by exercising his particular talents, and he can always
terminate the employment relationship. If he does so before an inven-
tion is made, he generally can relieve himself of his obligations to assign
it to his employer." If, however, a contract is so worded that the
employee appears to have agreed that he will assign everything he
ever invents, in any field, and forevermore, the courts undoubtedly
will strike this down as being against public policy. For example, in
Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 4 an employee executed a
contract whereby heagreed to assign inventions made during employ-
ment or which he may at any time thereafter make. The subject matter
of the assignment specifically covered "abrasives, adhesives, or related
materials, or to any business of the company." The court held that since
Guth was a chemical engineer, and inventing was his work, the door
should not be shut on his way of making a living. It therefore ruled
that the provisions in the contract which were not limited as to time
or subject matter were against public policy. That policy, said the
court, favors encouraging invention and discourages exclusion of an
employee from engaging in an occupation for which he is best suited.
Some of the subjects which have been held to involve properly
assignable future inventions made during the course of employment have
been aptly summarized by Costa "5 as follows:
12. Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 175 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1949); Guth
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294
U.S. 711 (1935) ; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1927)
Mississippi Glass Co. v. Franzen, 143 Fed. 501 (3d Cir. 1906).
13. Wege v. Safe-Cabinet Co., 249 Fed. 696 (6th Cir. 1918); Standard Plunger
Elevator Co. v. Stokes, 212 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. 1914); Thibodeau v. Hildreth, 124
Fed. 892 (lst Cir. 1903).
14. 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935).
15. COSTA, THt LAW OP INVENTING IN EMPLOYMENT (1953).
APRIL 1958]
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1. All future inventions which the employer could manufacture; 1
2. All discoveries relating to the machines in the employer's busi-
ness; 17
3. Inventions related to or connected with the employee's assigned
work; 1"
4. Inventions related to any business in which the employer was
concerned; '9
5. All patentable ideas and devices affecting the employers' busi-
ness ; 20 and
6. All drawings, patents and designs of the employer's machines,
and improvements to such machines.2 '
Further provisos are that the inventions are not for an illegal purpose,
that they fall within the scope of the contract, and have not involved
independent inventions or improvements.
The following are some collateral, but significant factors to be
considered in preparing or evaluating contracts to assign future in-
ventions. It is not necessary that the word "invention" be mentioned
in the employment agreement to constitute an employment to invent,
providing other expressions make this implication clear.22 The question
has often been raised as to whether inventions are assignable to an
employer if the contract only partly called for the making of new
developments. The answer is "yes," if it can be shown that the inven-
tion was in the field of developments on which the employee was to
work, even if only on part time. The work expected of the employee,
not his particular qualifications, determine whether or not he was
expected to invent or develop new ideas as part of the contract. Thus,
even if he were a skilled scientist or technical employee, he is not ex-
pected to invent unless his duties so provide.2" In defining the field
of inventions which are assignable to an employer, the terms of a
16. Hevi-Duty Electric Co. v. Weiser, 6 U.S.P.Q. 224 (D. Ill. 1930).
17. Hildreth v. Duff, 143 Fed. 139 (W.D. Pa. 1906).
18. Paley v. Du Pont Rayon Co., 71 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1934).
19. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935).
20. New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 4 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. N.Y. 1933), 71
F.2d 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 591 (1934).
21. Portland Iron Works v. Willett, 48 Ore. 483, 89 Pac. 421 (1907).
22. Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924); Salterini v. Schneider,
45 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
23. Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 Fed. 308 (N.D. Il1. 1918).
[VOL. 3: p. 300
5
Forman: Inventors and Their Relations with Others
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958
INVENTORS AND RELATIONS WITH OTHERS
contract must be strictly construed.24  A contract to assign future in-
ventions for a "reasonable," although unspecified compensation, has
been held to be enforceable, and the assignee could not maintain that it
is vague and indefinite since a "reasonable value" of what he received
from the assignor could be established.25 If an employee is under con-
tract to develop or invent along certain lines, he cannot avoid a require-
ment of the contract that he assign his inventions relating thereto merely
by proving that he made the invention while off duty2"
Suppose a contract required an employee to assign all inventions
made during employment that relate to the employer's business or to the
employee's assigned duties. We have seen that such contracts can be
quite proper. But suppose an invention is only partly made by the time
the employment period is over, is it the employer's property or the
former employee's? In at least one case it was held that if the invention
was sufficiently developed to make it possible to actually reduce it to
practice it was completed within the contract period, even though
actual completion of the development would occur only after employ-
ment was terminated. Hence, assignment to the employer was de-
creed. 7 If, however, the invention actually is made after employment
has terminated, the employee is not required to assign it to his former
employer even if the invention amounts to improvements upon a basic
patented invention which the employer owns."' It would not matter if
the basic patented invention was one which he himself had made while
under the employment contract, and which he had assigned to the
employer. Once the employment relationship is over, he is free to use
his inventive talents as he pleases. Of course, it is imperative that he
be able to prove that the invention was made after the employment was
over.
29
Efforts to get around these cases so as to give an employer some
protection, in a situation where he may have made it possible for an
24. Tennessee Copper & Chemical Corp. v. Martin, 4 F. Supp. 38 (D.NJ. 1932) ;
Detroit Testing Laboratory v. Robinson, 221 Mich. 442, 191 N.W. 218 (1922) ; White
Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 266 Pa. 551, 109 At. 685 (1920).
25. Dysart v. Remington Rand, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 596 (D. Conn. 1941); Howard,
v. Howe, 61 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1932).
26. Toledo Machine & Tool Co. v. Byerlein, 9 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1925) ; United
States v. Houghton, 20 F.2d 434 (D. Md. 1927); Mississippi Glass Co. v. Franzen,
143 Fed. 501 (3d Cir. 1906).
27. National Development Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783 (1944).
See also Smoley v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 24 F. Supp. 294 (D. N.J. 1938).
28. New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F.2d (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
591 (1934).
29. See, Pure Oil Co. v. Hyman, 95 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1938).
APRIL 1958]
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employee to develop the know-how that led to a post-employment in-
vention, have failed in many cases even when a specific proviso to that
effect is included in the contract. When covenants binding employees
to assign inventions to their employers for an indefinite term after
employment failed in certain cases brought to bar, from one to five year
limitations were tried in other cases but without success when the issues
were tried in court.3 '  In still other cases the courts have approved
requirements to assign inventions made within a reasonably limited
field after employment has terminated, especially where it is shown that
such a restriction is essential to the protection of the employer's busi-
ness.3 In the latter cases it is clear that any provisions requiring
assignment of post-employment inventions must be strictly construed. 2
It is hard to reconcile these two lines of cases. Perhaps the reasons
given for not enforcing the requirement was best expressed in Mullins
Mfg. Co. v. Booth,"8 where it was held that courts of equity are loathe
to give their aid by construction to a contract, the enforcement of which
will constitute a mortgage for life on the inventor's brain and bind all
his future products. This equitable doctrine has to be weighed against
the need to give an employer protection against such contingencies as
possible loss of his business, or a large share thereof. Thus, a restric-
tion may be approved in one case, and not in another, depending upon
other factors involving the contracting parties.
Keeping in mind what has been said thus far, 4 this would be a
good time to review some of the forms of employment agreements now
in use by many of our large corporations. To obtain this information
letters were sent to twenty-six companies, mostly the larger, nationally
known organizations. Because some asked that they not be identified,
no names will be mentioned. The collected data will be found in Table I.
30. E.g., Standard Plunger Elevator Co. v. Stokes, 212 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. 1914) ;
Lanteen Laboratories, Inc. v. Clark, 294 Ill. App. 81, 13 N.E.2d 678 (1938); Na-
tional Cash Register Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 242 N.Y. 99, 151 N.E. 144 (1926)
White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 266 Pa. 551, 109 Atl. 685 (1920).
31. E.g., Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d
353 (9th Cir. 1927) ; Chadeloid Chemical Co. v. H. B. Chalmers Co., 243 Fed. 606 (2d
Cir. 1917) ; Hulse v. Bonsack Machine Co., 65 Fed. 864 (4th Cir. 1895) ; Universal
Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952); Dry Ice Corp. of
America v. Josephson, 43 F.2d 408 (E.D. N.Y. 1930).
32. Gas Tool Patents Corp. v. Mould, 133 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1943).
33. 125 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1942).
34. An excellent source for information concerning employer-employee agree-
ments, and one from which a considerable amount of data was obtained for this
paper, is ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS (3d ed. 1955). Another very good reference
on this subject is COSTA, THE LAW OF INVENTING IN EMPLOYMENT (1953).
306 [VOL. 3: p. 300
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The Annual Report for 1951 by the Committee on Employer-
Employee Relations of the American Bar Association's Patent Section
gave some additional information on this score. This information,
which is tabulated below, represents the total of four different surveys
made by various agencies in the period 1945-1950.
"Tabulation of Employer-Employee Inventions' Agreements
Companies reporting 809
Require written agreement 457
All employees 165
Technical and salaried employees only 95
All inventions 145
Inventions relating only to company's business 330
Inventions made
(a) During employment 317
(b) Three months to two years after employment 100
Compensation
(a) None other than pay 196
(b) Bonus 73
(c) % Income from patent licensing of others 32"
The same American Bar Association committee, in its 1953 report,
promulgated the following principles:
"1. It is entirely equitable to require an employer-employee agree-
ment covering inventions.
2. An agreement of this kind should cover technical employees only
(as alternative, can also include other employees whose work
is likely to be productive of invention).
3. The agreement should cover only inventions relating to the
present business of the company (as alternative, can also relate
to future business, but in either event should be limited to the
field of employment in which the employee worked).
4. The agreement should cover only inventions made during the
actual period of employment.
5. The agreement may also cover inventions made during a short
'safety' period such as six months to a year, after the employee
leaves the employment of the company.
6. Some adequate incentives should be provided to encourage em-
ployees to make and disclose inventions.
7. The agreement should be made as simple and short as possible."
B.
The Independent Inventor.
Let us now consider some of the problems confronting the in-
dependent inventor who wishes to sell rights to his invention. In the
[VOL. 3: p. 300
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first place, there may be considered two types of such inventors: one,
who wishes to sell only his invention; and the other who sells his
invention and his services to help develop the invention he sells. Each
of these types has many of the same requirements which we considered
with reference to the hired inventor. There- are some factors which are
applicable only to the independent inventor, as a rule, and these will now
be discussed.
Berle and DeCamp have aptly summarized the various methods by
which an inventor can profit from his invention. They are:
"1. To practice the invention himself;
2. To sell the patent;
3. To issue licenses;
4. To issue territorial grants;
5. To lease the patented machine or equipment to manufacturers;
6. To obtain exclusive right to the use, in his invention, of some
component material or part, patented or otherwise controlled
by others;
7. To keep the inventions secret;
8. To exploit the invention without any protection." a
There are all kinds of inventors. Some are "career" inventors, i.e.,
they are bound to become inventors because they are skilled technical
people or persons who are always "dabbling" in some art or science.
As a rule, these kinds of inventors rarely are also experienced business-
men and/or manufacturers. Yet, no matter how good an invention
appears to be, it will undoubtedly need considerable business ingenuity,
capital, sales and distribution facilities and organization, as well as
manufacturing capacity in order to succeed. Rarely will the "career"
inventor have any one of these faculties to an appreciable degree, let
alone be competent in all of them. Unless the inventor has a good
measure of these skills he would do well to either sell his invention or
acquire some trusted and interested associates who have those which he
lacks.
It is a rarer case, still, where a skilled businessman, with access to
a ready-made sales and distribution organization, and manufacturing
facilities, makes a really salable invention. When it does happen he
may be a lot better off than the skilled "career" inventor who has noth-
ing more with which to sponsor his brainchildren. However, this
extremely rare species of inventor would do well to have his idea gone
over by some skilled artisan in the field to which his invention applies to
35. B4RLI AND Dx CAMP, INVSNTIONS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 384 (3d ed.
1951).
APRIL 1958]
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see if the invention has any "bugs" in it which should be eliminated, and
maybe otherwise to improve the invention by simplifying its construc-
tion, cheapening its manufacture, etc.
Whichever direction the inventor decides to take he is well advised
if he decides as soon as possible on the method he will employ in seeking
to exploit his invention. In trying to make this decision he will find it
necessary to appraise the potential market for his invention, and if he is
like most people he will overestimate this while soaring on the wings of
desire and carried away by his dreams of overnight success and wealth.
This is particularly true if the inventor is new in the business. He
will also have to evaluate the costs of getting the invention on the
market, and again we may expect him to look at all this through rose-
tinted spectacles with the inevitable result that he will thoroughly under-
estimate them. If either or both of these occur he may decide unwisely
to attempt to make and sell the invention himself or in cooperation with
an equally unequipped group of friends. Or, if he decides to sell, his
asking price may be entirely out of line with the invention's potential
as adjudged by hard-headed businessmen armed with all the available
facts.
Inventions for which there is no demand are a drug on the market
regardless of how clever they appear to be. If the invention did not
arise over an attempt to fulfill some known and widespread need, the
inventor had better ascertain quickly just what the need is before going
further. If the need is there, the inventor better act while the need is
strong, because someone else may come along to satisfy or circumvent it.
Later on we shall consider the question of evaluating an invention
so as to determine the price for which to sell or buy it. The answers to
this question are of obvious importance to the independent inventor who
wants to exploit his invention or to sell all or a part of it. If such
estimates in terms of dollars and cents seem to indicate that the inventor
would do well to sell his invention, provided that he can obtain a certain
price, there are some other factors he will want to consider. One is
whether to sell it outright or to reserve a share in it. Another is how
to approach a customer, i.e., by maintaining the invention as a confi-
dential disclosure or attempting first to patent it. These questions also
will be discussed later.
Let us consider some of the more important legal issues which may
arise when an independent inventor attempts to sell his inventions. An
owner of a patent right may contract with respect to any part thereof,
but legal title does not pass until a proper assignment has been duly
executed. The equitable assignee may, however, sue for damages or
for specific performance if the owner of the legal title fails to execute the
[VOL. 3: p. 300
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assignment as agreed. 6 Actually, either party can bring an action to
enforce an agreement to assign the legal title, except in a case where
there is only an option and not a contract to assign. In that event only
the owner of the option can bring such an action.3 7  A contract to
assign will only be enforceable if it was delivered and consideration
therefor was paid as agreed.38 Suppose a contract called for the sale
of an invention described in a patent application, but payment is to be
deferred until the patent issues. If the claims which are in the issued
patent are much narrower than those in the application when the
agreement was entered into, the agreement may not be binding unless
the contract specifically provides that such diminution in scope of the
allowed claims will not affect the agreement. 9 Unlike licenses, con-
tracts to assign inventions are not personal and therefore are assignable
to a third party.4' Contracts for assignment of inventions usually are
express in nature, but they also may be implied from confidential rela-
tionships. 1 As in the case of the hired inventor, contracts to assign
inventions or patent rights may be oral, and they are not terminated
by death of the inventor or assignor.
One of the most important rules of law concerning sales of inven-
tions by independent inventors has to do with agreements for the sale
of future inventions. On this point, probably the best statement of the
law was pronounced in Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger, where
the court said:
"Presumptively, a contract for the sale of inventions grants
rights only to those inventions which existed when the contract
was made. If the parties intend to contract for future inventions,
language plainly expressive of such purpose must appear. There
is no principle of law which holds that one who has sold an article
impliedly agrees thereby that he will not compete with the purchaser
in the sale of the same or similar articles or will not produce or
sell anything that may serve as a substitute therefor." 4
36. Mississippi Glass Co. v. Franzen, 143 Fed. 501 (3d Cir. 1906) ; Wright v.
Vocalion Organ Co., 148 Fed. 209 (1st Cir. 1906).
37. McMillan v. Davis, 54 Pa. Super. 154 (1913).
38. Hancock v. Smith, 90 F. Supp. 45 (W.D.Va. 1950).
39. Hargraves v. Pitkin Mach. Co., 19 R.I. 426, 34 Atl. 738 (1896).
40. Oliver v. Rumford Chemical Works, 109 U.S. 75 (1883); A.B. Dick Co. v.
Fuller, 6 F.2d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
41. Saco-Lowell Shops v. Reynolds, 141 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1944); Shellmar
Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936); Diversey Corp. v.
Mertz, 13 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1937).
42. 31 F.2d 188, 197 (W.D. Pa. 1929). See also Lamson v. Martin, 159 Mass.
557, 35 N.E. 78 (1893).
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II.
CONFIDENTIAL DISCLOSURES.
Although the applicable law concerning contracts for the sale of
inventions by independent inventors is of interest, of equal if not greater
interest is the very practical problem-faced by inventors and purchasers
alike-of how to handle confidential disclosures by "outside" or in-
dependent inventors. Of particular interest is the case where the
disclosures to possible purchasers are entirely unsolicited. This is a
very real and vexing problem which many companies and independent
inventors face each day. Every company of any size is faced with the
prospect of receiving not only unsolicited but often unwanted offers
to sell rights to an invention. Some companies welcome such dis-
closures, either as a matter of fostering good will and better public
relations, or because they actually pick up a valuable idea in this way
which will help them in their business. Other companies find that in-
ventions submitted by outside inventors amount to little more than a
big nuisance which inevitably lead to poor public relations and often
into litigation. Too often the submitted ideas are along lines with which
the company may have been working in its own laboratories for some
time before. But it becomes a difficult matter to convince the outsider,
who makes a parallel if not identical disclosure, of this fact; he is sure
to feel that the company has "borrowed" his ideas without benefit of
contract. Of course, to keep the record straight, we must recognize that
there have been instances when this feeling has been borne out by
the facts.
Let us suppose that an outside inventor submits an invention dis-
closure to some firm without there having been any prior agreement to
cover the situation. If the disclosure has been patented, the inventor and
the prospective purchaser can deal with each other quite openly. The
patented invention can be fully evaluated by the would-be assignee,
entirely independently of the inventor, as by searching the art, studying
the file history of the patent, testing the invention to see if it works and
how it may possibly be utilized, etc. In all such dealings the pertinent
patent laws would govern the rights and liabilities of the parties prior
to and even after an agreement of some sort is reached.
Where there is no express contract between the parties and no
patent is involved, there are four general conditions which must be met
before the inventor can recover from the prospective purchaser for un-
authorized use of his idea:
[VOL. 3: p. 300
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"1. There must be a trade secret-i.e., some information not previ-
ously known in the trade and valuable to the trade.
2. The trade secret must be disclosed by the plaintiff to the defend-
ant.
3. The disclosure of the trade secret to the defendant by the plain-
tiff must have been made under conditions where there is a
confidential relationship, either express or implied, between the
parties.
4. There must be a use by the defendant of the trade secret without
permission from or compensation to the plaintiff." 4
The fact that no patent is involved will oblige both parties to rely upon
the laws pertaining to trade secrets and alleged confidential disclosures
thereof. If it can be shown that there was such a disclosure and that
the receipient made use of it, recovery will lie for such use even though
it took place before a patent issued. In Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg.
Co.,44 for example, there had been a considerable amount of negotiation
and close working relationship between the two parties before they
broke with each other. The plaintiff sued for infringement of the patent
on his invention and also for damages for use of his invention before the
patent had issued. The court held for the plaintiff, awarding damages
on the theory of unjust enrichment for use of the confidential disclosure
since the subject matter was maintained in secrecy from the rest of the
public while in the Patent Office.
Of course, before damages can be obtained for breach of a con-
fidential disclosure there must be satisfactory proof that a genuine secret
was disclosed. If a matter is once made public, it cannot later be
blanketed with the cloak of privacy even though it be a completely novel
revelation to the recipient of the information. A mere agreement by
the seller and buyer of an alleged confidential disclosure that the subject
matter of their agreement is a trade secret will not make it so if, in fact,
the idea is later shown to have been an old one known to the public."
43. Cantor, Trade Secrets, 35 MICH. ST. B.J. 7, 8 (1956). See Dow Chemical
v. American Bromide, 210 Mich. 262, 177 N.W. 996 (1920), where the court held that
the plaintiff could not enjoin the defendant, one of its former employees, from using
a process which was in essence described in an issued patent as it was no longer a
secret even though the former employee had learned of the process while employed
and before the patent issued. In Dutch Cookie Mach. Co. v. Vande Vrede, 289 Mich.
272, 286 N.W. 612 (1939), a former employee was not enjoined when he sold cookie
rolls in competition with the plaintiff because the court found that the so-called trade
secrets were known to the trade beforehand.
44. 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935).
45. Galanis v. Proctor & Gamble Corp., 153 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ; O'Brien
v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Bristol v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506 (1892). See also, E.I. DuPont De
Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917) ; Baum v. Jones & Laughlin
Supply Co., 233 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1956) ; Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Products,
Inc., 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Skoog v. McCray Refrigerator Co., 211 F.2d 254
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This "rule" appears to have been sidetracked in some cases where
the courts felt that it was more important to determine whether the
receiver of information did so on a confidential basis, and the fact that
the information was not new (i.e., it was known to others in the public)
was of secondary importance.4"
Assuming that a genuine trade secret exists, to hold liable anyone
to whom this information is imparted it is necessary to establish that
the defendant actually obtained the disclosure from the plaintiff. It is
a perfectly valid and effective defense to show that the information was
lawfully obtained from sources other than the plaintiff.47 Furthermore,
if the defendant can establish that its relationships with the plaintiff
were strictly at arm's length, and that there was never at any time any
agreement to accept in confidence information imparted by plaintiff,
liability for breach of an alleged confidential relationship will not lie.48
With regard to the question as to whether or not a confidential
relationship exists, this may be determined in at least two ways. One is
by examining an express agreement, if any, between the parties; this is
not difficult, as a rule. The other is by examining the actions of the
parties in dealing with each other to see if any confidential relationship
can be implied therefrom; this is often quite difficult, but of course will
vary in degree of difficulty with the facts. The more complex the subject
matter, the more time and effort required to create or develop it, the
greater the length of time in which the parties have been negotiating, the
more cooperative effort there has been exerted between the parties,
the more likely is the court to decide that there was a confidential
relationship.49
As a general summary observation it may be stated that the furnish-
ing of unsolicited disclosures to a prospective purchaser, and the mere
(1st Cir. 1954); Mitchell Novelty Co. v. United Mfg. Co., 199 F.2d 462 (7th Cir.
1952) ; Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 107 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ill.
1952); Newell v. 0. A. Newton & Son Co., 104 F. Supp. 162 (Del. 1952); Gallowhur
Chemical Corp. v. Schwerdle, 37 N.J.S. 385, 117 A.2d 416 (1955).
46. Protexol Corp. v. Koppers Co., 229 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1956); Extrin Foods
Inc. v. Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1952). In the Extrin
case, which involved a suit against a former employee to enjoin use of a formula
claimed to be a secret and given in confidence, the court held that the important issue
was not whether it is new or could have been discovered by defendant by fair means,
but whether the parties dealt at arm's length and whether their negotiations were of
such character as to put the defendants in a position whereby they were bound to
respect the information given them by the plaintiff, and not to use it for their own
benefit. In the Protexol case, which involved a formula for a fire retardant disclosed
by the plaintiff to the defendant, the court held that whether the formula was new
or old was immaterial. The defendant's obligation, voluntarily made, to pay for the
use by it at stipulated rates, and to refrain from disclosure, continued even after the
defendant might discover it had or thought it would get the same information by way
of something known in the art.
47. Heisel v. Chrysler Corp., 94 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
48. Ibid.
49. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
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review thereof without any commitments or promises one way or the
other, does not create a confidential relationship between the parties.
A great deal more is necessary before such a status can be assumed to
exist. Without establishing that there was in fact such a relationship,
that the disclosure concerned a genuine secret, i.e., something not
previously known publicly, and that there was some impropriety by
the recipient in dealing with the discloser, the latter cannot prevail in
an action against the former for wrongful use of the alleged secret idea.
It is not too difficult to recommend a course of action to be taken
by independent inventors who wish to seek a buyer for their ideas and
yet protect themselves against the possibility that an unscrupulous
party will steal the products of their genius or efforts. First and
foremost, patent the idea before disclosure. A second best alternative
is at least to get the patent application on file before showing the idea
to anyone. Third, disclose the idea only under such conditions that the
establishment of a confidential relationship can be proved. The best
way to do this last is to enter into a written agreement with the party
to whom the disclosure is to be made that whatever is divulged will
be treated as confidential information and will not be used without
properly compensating the discloser as agreed. The first two sugges-
tions are more or less obvious and well known considerations, and
generally are followed whenever practicable. The third one may be
just as obvious but is not generally followed for the simple, but very
effective, reason that few well-intentioned, legitimate purchasers care
to run the risk of thus binding themselves. Instead, they may prefer
to require an express waiver of any confidential relationship by the
discloser so as to have at least that much protection against the inven-
tor's later deciding to bring suit. Whether or not such waivers will be
demanded will depend on the prospective buyer's evaluation of the
possible worth of the idea (s) which outside sources may submit to him,
and the weight he gives to them as against the possibility of all kinds
of headaches he might get if he should decide to deal with the inventor
without the benefit of a waiver.
Cases are legion on the results and/or efforts of disclosures by
outside inventors."' By studying them one can develop a deeper ap-
50. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) ; E. I. Du
Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917) ; Chicago Board of
Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905) ; Washburn & Moen Mfg.
Co. v. Beat 'Em All Barbed Wire Co., 143 U.S. 275 (1892) ; Franke v. Wiltschek,
209 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207
F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954) ; Northrup v. Reish, 200
F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F.2d 631 (2nd
Cir. 1946) ; Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 673 (1936) ; A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531
(6th Cir. 1934), modified on rehearing, 74 F.2d 934 (1935) ; Shellmar Products Co.
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preciation of the precautions which the discloser and the would-be
purchaser should take to protect their respective interests. Table 2
tabulates data obtained from some twenty-six firms who were solicited
directly for information as to how they prefer to deal with ideas sub-
mitted by outside inventors. These firms are representative of a variety
of mechanical, chemical and electrical industries.
III.
LICENSING.
In the general area of patent licensing "' there are at least four
principal subjects to consider. One is the type of license, second is the
manner of computing royalties if the license is to contain a royalty-
paying provision, third is the nature of the clauses which the license
should contain, and the fourth is the basis ,for establishing the value of
the patent(s) to be licensed.
The different types of licenses have been classified as follows:
1. Non-exclusive
2. Exclusive
3. Limited exclusive:
(a) Exclusive except that licensor reserves right to use in-
vention.
(b) Exclusive rights in a specific territory, as a state or
nation.
(c) Exclusive rights for a limited period of time (e.g. a year).
(1) After period, licensor can license others or review
license.
(d) Exclusive as to a particular industry, but not exclusive
as to non-competing industries.
With respect to royalty-based licenses, there are at least two ways
in which royalties can be computed. One is based upon the number of
v. Allen-Qualley Co., 36 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1929) ; Telechron, Inc. v. Parissi, 120 F.
Supp. 235 (N.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 440 (1955); McCarthy v. City of New
York, 106 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Bohlman v. American Paper Goods Co., 53
F. Supp. 794 (N.J. 1943) ; Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 62 (Mass.
1942); Kohloff v. Ford Motor Co., 37 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Adolph
Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 18 N.J. 467, 114 A.2d 438 (1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955) ; Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138
N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (1946) ; Lakoff v. Lionel Corp., 207 Misc. 319, 137 N.Y.S.2d
806 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
51. The discussion on licensing, in the main, was drawn from BEtLX AND DE
CAMP, INVENTIONS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT c. 29 (3d ed. 1951). The hypothetical
examples of bases for establishing and computing royalties have been taken bodily
from that work. Permission for this direct reproduction in part, and paraphrasing in
part, was very kindly granted by the publisher, D. Van Nostrand & Co., Princeton,
N. J. Where other references were relied upon they have been cited separately.
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items made; another is based upon the number of items sold. The
licensor benefits more from the former because samples, give-aways,
etc. will be subject to royalties as well as products actually sold. Either
one could have a royalty rate which is based upon:
1. A fixed sum for each certain number of the items licensed.
2. The actual selling price of the articles (usually the factory
price).
3. The actual profit derived by the manufacturer.
Under the most favorable conditions the royalties payable usually will
be between 5-10 per cent of the factory price (which in turn generally
runs between 40-65 per cent of the retail price). In many situations
the royalty rate is not a flat one but instead may be based upon inverse
sliding rates, i.e., the royalty rate decreases as the volume of items made
.or sold increases.
Licenses having running royalty provisions, as a rule, are subject to
many pitfalls which affect either of the parties. They merit careful
draftsmanship and study. While it would be impossible to consider
at this time every type of situation one could meet in drafting such
licenses, it may be helpful to mention a few of the more common factors
one should keep in mind. For example, if a royalty is to be based upon
sales or upon a percentage of profits, the licensor should determine to
whom and at what prices the articles are to be sold. Suppose the licensee
is going to sell at cost to a subsidiary who then sells at a profit; the
license should be based upon what the subsidiary sells. Then, too, when
stating that the royalty is based upon the selling price, is the list or net
price meant? If the latter, there better be a precise definition of the
term because there may be discounts or allowances involved.
The license should state when the first and later reports and pay-
ments are to be made. Consideration should be given to inclusion of a
guaranteed minimum royalty so that if the minimum is not paid the
licensor can cancel the agreement. This minimum could, if desired,
be varied over the lifetime of the licensed patent(s).
Before licensing a manufacturer, the licensor would do well to check
his business rating and try to determine why he might want the patent.
What use is he going to put the patent to? Should there be a clause
guaranteeing certain uses or prohibiting others ? The licensee, of course,
will want to do some checking on his own. He will want to know some-
thing about the patent's validity, if possible, whether it is subservient
to other patents, whether the licensor has complete and clear title thereto,
whether any shop rights are involved, etc.
[VOL. 3: p. 300
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The buyer of a patent is not bound by any license agreements in-
volving the patent if he has no knowledge thereof and if they have not
been recorded in the Patent Office. This is at least one reason why
licenses, as well as assignments, should be recorded. Sometimes it
may not be desirable to let the terms of the license be made available
to the public in this way. To avoid this situation, the license can be
prepared in two documents. One will contain a simple form of license
(or assignment) but without reference to the actual sales price or royalty
rate. Nominal consideration can be recited instead. This document is
recorded. The other document, which can contain all data which the
parties wish to maintain in confidence, can be kept unrecorded.
Non-estoppel clauses, which favor the licensee, but against which
the licensor will rarely complain, should be in a license so that the
grantee can challenge the validity of the patent if it appears subject to
such attack. Of course, if a licensor could get the licensee to agree in
the document that the patents are valid and incontestable by him, the
former will have that much of an advantage. On the other hand, it is
best that the licensor never guarantees the validity of the licensed patents
because whole contracts can be struck down on proof of invalidity.
Other clauses which should be considered include the following.
Whether the licensee is to have the privilege of granting sub-licenses;
if so, to whom and under what terms and conditions? Foreign rights
should be defined. Improvement inventions should be considered, as
well as the ramifications thereof; who gets what? If an infringement
suit or threat of one arises, who conducts the litigation and who pays
what costs? Termination of the license on account of bankruptcy or
other causes should be covered with conditions of termination such as
a notice period, etc. fully spelled out.
It is often very important to determine whether the legal transfer
of patent rights is a license or an assignment. Merely calling it one or
the other does not make it so if the legal effect of the terms agreed to
by the parties is otherwise."2 As Ellis has stated:
"The broad fundamental practical difference between an as-
signment and a license is that the former gives the transferee the
right to sue for infringement, and the latter gives the transferee
immunity from suit for infringement. The first gives positive
rights, the second negative rights."
In Waterman v. Mackenzie,5 4 the Court stated that an exclusive
license to make, use and sell a patented invention was actually an assign-
52. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
53. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS 68 (3d ed. 1955).
54. 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
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ment. Ellis points out that this was pure dicta and cites cases showing
that this so-called "rule" is a doubtful one. 55 He contends that an
exclusive license is merely an agreement that the licensor will not grant
licenses to others and usually that the licensor also will abstain from
practicing the invention. But this agreement does not transfer to the
exclusive licensee the right to sue infringers; such a right still remains
with the licensor. The same is true with respect to the right to sue
for past infringements. If the license (or assignment) does not
specifically provide for it, the licensee (exclusive or otherwise) cannot
sue for past infringement. 6
Before leaving this phase of the subject of licensing, as long as we
have seen that a license, so-called, can actually have the effect of an
assignment, it may be well to comment on a principle of patent law that
is rather unique as far as personal property is concerned. An assign-
ment of a fractional interest in a patent is, for all intents and purposes,
equivalent to transfer of equal ownership of the whole patent regardless
of the size of the fraction. The co-owners of the patent are owners in
common, or cotenants, or tenants in common. Each is invested with
an undivided interest in the patent. In the absence of a binding agree-
ment as to its use, each co-owner may manufacture, use, license, or
dispose of his interest without the other's consent and without account-
ing to the other for profits. Each may use the whole of the invention
or he may grant a nonexclusive license to outsiders to use it and he may
retain the proceeds. 7 The way to avoid this, in case one wishes to
assign (or exclusively license) less than a whole patent interest, is to
include limitations such as time, area, amounts of the invention which
can be made, used and sold, etc.
Before one gets to the provisions in the formal license document
discussed above there is, of course, the all-important problem of "strik-
ing the bargain," i.e., agreeing as to the terms of the license. This
generally requires a great deal of skill in negotiation, knowledge of the
field or industry involved, and often just plain good luck. Whatever
the situation, there are always some general considerations involved to
which we shall first turn our attention.
When parties to a patent licensing negotiation size up the problem
confronting them they generally find they have to place a value on one
55. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS 89 (3d ed. 1955).
56. Kriger v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1941);
Herman v. Detroit Shipbuilding Co., 295 Fed. 423 (E.D. Mich. 1924) ; Jones v. Bergen,
58 Fed. 1006 (Md. 1893) ; Olsson v. United States, 72 Ct. Cl. 72 (1931), modified on
rehearing, 25 F. Supp. 495 (1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 621 (1939).
57. Turchan v. Bailey Meter Co., 19 F.R.D. 201 (Del. 1956) ; Ful-Vue Sales Co.
v. American Optical Co., 118 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Aberdeen Hosiery Mills
Co. v. Kaufman, 96 U.S.P.Q. 133; Milgram v. Jiffy Equipment Co., 362 Mo. 1194,
247 S.W.2d 668 (1952).
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of two types of patented inventions: (a) one that has been put into
use; and (b) one that has not yet been put into use. In the former
situation there is some experience on which to base the appraisal; in
the latter there is mere conjecture.5 8
From a licensor's viewpoint some classes of patents have little
value. Manufacturing methods and processes which are difficult to
trace may, if patented, make enforcement against infringers very diffi-
cult. In the same general category are patents which are easily circum-
vented, or have very limited application. By contrast some patents are
inherently valuable, e.g., basic and much needed compositions of matter,
or a new industrial process, or a much needed and used machine.
A patent by itself may have little value. Yet, as part of a group of
patents covering a certain field or area it may have great value. This is
particularly true of patents on improvements to earlier patented develop-
ments.
What is a patent worth? Like any other piece of property it is
worth as much as you can get for it if you are the seller, or as much as
you are willing to pay for it if you are the buyer. The value of a patent
is subject to nearly all the variables one can think of as affecting salable
merchandise. The time, the place, the condition, the need or demand,
the supply, all have their respective effects.
In trying to arrive at a price for a patent both the licensor and the
licensee would like to estimate what the possession of the patent right
by the latter will do for him. As Bennett, in his economic interpreta-
tion of The American Patent System, has pointed out " there are three
reasons why a prospective user, say a manufacturer, would want a license
under a patent:
1. To reduce his costs of production by increasing efficiency (usu-
ally applicable to machinery, equipment or manufacturing
processes).
2. To differentiate his product and make it more marketable
(usually applicable to the product or improvements thereon,
although a new manufacturing process may do the same).
3. To restrict competition (applicable only where an exclusive
license is obtained).
Bennett has analyzed the following cases as being typical of the
effects upon the licensee of the various types of financial arrangements
that might be found in a license agreement:
58. BENNETT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 142 (1943).
59. Id. at 157.
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1. "License fee amortized over the life of the patent.
2. Flat royalty per unit of output.
3. Per unit royalty that decreases with expansion of output.
4. Per unit royalty that increases with expansion of output.
5. Combination license fee plus flat royalty per unit.
6. Royalty stated as a per cent of selling price.
7. Royalty stated as a per cent of net profits." 60
He summarized the results of his analysis as follows:
"Having considered various royalty arrangements and their
effects upon costs, prices, profits, and output, the conclusion is that
there is no easy solution to the various questions involved. There
are too many variables that must be recognized to make general
conclusions possible. General tendencies can be pointed out, how-
ever.
"The effect upon a firm's profits of taking a patent license
depends, basically, upon the relationship between the demand for
the 'product' and the average total cost. This relationship deter-
mines the profit per unit. The profitableness of the license turns
upon the relative change in profit per unit as compared with the
relative change in output before and after taking the license. To
the extent that use of the licensed patent increases the efficiency of
the firm's operations and lowers its marginal cost curve, the output
will be greater and the price will be lower for any given demand.
If the charge for the use of the patent increases the average total
cost, but not the marginal cost, output and price will not change,
but profits will be less, for any given demand. Furthermore, if
payment for the use of the patent causes marginal cost to increase,
the scale of operations will decrease and the price will be higher.
If utilization of the patent differentiates the 'product' and causes
the firm's demand curve to move to the right, price will be higher
and the scale of operations will be greater, ceteris paribus. When
more than one of these several factors are effective at the same
time it is necessary to proceed step by step until all have been con-
sidered in order to determine the net result." 61
So much for the effect of economic laws and principles on a patent
licensing problem. One interested in getting a deeper insight would
do well to study the data set forth by Dr. Bennett in chapter IX of his
excellent book. But for one who would like to have more specific
information of a practical nature as a guide to patent licensing negotia-
tions, unfortunately such data based on actual experiences is not avail-
60. Id. at 158.
61. Id. at 180, 181.
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able. One reason for this is that people just do not go around telling
or writing about their experiences in this form of "horse trading."
There are some obvious notions such as: (a) the licensor trying to
get all that the traffic will bear and the licensee driving the hardest
bargain it possibly can; and (b) the general premise that if a royalty
is to be charged it will be on the higher side if the license is to have a
short run or involve large principal sums, and on the lower side if a
long run or small principal sums are involved. Aside from such
notions I find it difficult to suggest a genuine technique which one
could use around the bargaining table.
Most licenses involving royalties based on a percentage of sales
that the author has heard about generally have recited a 10 per cent
figure when the principal sums were rather modest, and scaled down
to 5 per cent or even 1 per cent when the return to the licensor based on
such low percentages would be certain to run into five, six or even seven
figures. One well known private practitioner has suggested that a 10-
15 per cent royalty is most common when the patents involved have
definite value to the licensee other than so-called "nuisance value." He
states 62 further that a share for the licensor of as much as 25-30 per
cent is often met in situations most favorable to him, namely when the
licensed patent is so strong that the licensee has reasonable assurance of
freedom from unlicensed competition and the subject matter is so well
developed that the licensee will have little to do or invest in order to
start profiting therefrom.
Aside from these so-called "case histories," the best we can do in
the way of proposing how one might tackle the problem of determining
royalty rates is by reference to Berl and DeCamp's well'known book
Inventions and Their Management, particularly chapter 26, "Evaluat-
ling a Patent." a With the permission of the publishers we will
summarize three hypothetical examples which are illustrative of the
way a price tag for a patented invention can be arrived at.
Production Machinery Patents (The simplest case).
The saving which the machines will effect usually is the basis for
establishing the value of the patent in the case of an outright sale, or for
establishing the rate of royalty to be paid under a license agreement. It
can be figured on the basis of time (dollars/day or year), or of produc-
tion (dollars or cents/unit produced).
62. Hoxie, "Royalties," a talk given at the Practising Law Institute Saturday
Forum, New York City, February 27, 1954, on "Doing Business with Patents and
Technical Know-How."
63. BMMI AND Dt CAMP, INVENTIONS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT (3d ed. 1951),
by special permission of the publisher.
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Suppose a patented invention is a machine that acts on 1,000
units/day. The machine has expenses-first cost amortization, interest
on investment, cost of operation (power, supplies, repairs, replacements,
labor, plant overhead, etc.). If a new machine is invented, the same
expenses exist-plus unamortized cost of old machine. Suppose the
new machine is able to save $10/day, or $3,000/year. Not all ma-
chines will be needed of the same size, etc., but assuming all these dif-
ferent factors are taken into account and it is determined that if the
entire industry converted to the new machines, the savings would be
ten times that brought about by one-or say $30,000/year.
For how many years will this saving take place? For the life of
the patent? There are too many contingencies; the markets may
change; new inventions will make their predecessors obsolete, etc. Ten
years is the customary basis deemed the average effective profitable life
of a patent. Sometimes (as when an industry is highly mechanized
and changes are rapid) it is only five years. The period starts when
the working of the invention begins. Using ten years as our basis,
then, we would have a total saving of $300,000.
But suppose one company is very conservative. Another's business
is not so good. Another just acquired old machines and cannot afford
a change. Sales may be only one-half, or a total of $150,000 saving is
all that can be effected.
What should the inventor's share be? Should it be based on this
gross savings? Or shall it be the net after expenses? If the latter,
what expenses? Well, the manufacturer takes all the risk and respon-
sibility, and does all the work in commercializing the invention. He
doubtless will have to bear the costs of possible litigation. There may
be other costs too.
Suppose the parties agree that one-third of the total savings minus
the estimated cost of litigation would be a fair price for the invention.
One company estimates the litigation costs at $10,000 per infringer.
If we assume that one-third of $150,000 or $50,000 is the base price,
and that two infringers have to be sued at a cost of $20,000, there is a
balance left of $30,000. This last would be the actual price payable
for the patent. If the buyer objected to a total cash payment, he might
agree to, say, ten yearly payments of $3,000 each.
Suppose the inventor wanted to retain ownership of his patent and
to issue royalty licenses. What terms shall he seek? If he issues a
number of non-exclusive licenses, he will have to defend the patent.
Shall he base the license cost on savings to the user? Or on units
made? Or on units sold?
[VOL. 3: p. 300
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Let us use as our basis for computation the following: production
by machine of 1,000 items/day will save $10 per day, or one cent/unit.
Two-fifths of that is 2/5 of a cent ($0.004) per unit, which would
be a fair royalty if non-exclusive licenses were issued. If the industry
is a stable one, the patentee may have to pare a little off his price since
he is not giving any one manufacturer title to the patent. If the in-
dustry is a variable one, he could charge more since he is undertaking
to share in the manufacturer's risks.
Tabulating the foregoing, we get:
(a) Production units/machine/day 1,000
(b) Savings/machine/day $10
(c) Working days/year 300
(d) Savings/machine/year (b) X (c) $3,000
(e) Production of industry, units/day 11,000
(f) Factor of loss from variation in size .91
(g) Theoretical savings possible in industry/year
(d) X (e) - (a) $33,000
(h) Theoretical savings/year X loss factor, (f) X (g) $30,000
(i) Effective life of patent, years 10
(j) Corrected total theoretical saving, (h) X (i) $300,000
(k) Factor of acceptance of invention 5
(1) Maximum probate 10-year saving $150,000
(m) Inventor's share, sale basis .333
(n) Theoretical patent value, (1) X (m) $50,000
(o) Estimated cost of litigation $20,000
(p) Actual price of patent, (n) - (o) $30,000
(q) Unit patent savings, (b) -- (a) $.01
(r) Inventor's share, royalty basis .40
(s) Rate of royalty per unit, (q) X (r) $.004
If the patentee issues an exclusive license, the rate of royalty
should be higher. How much higher will depend on whether the buyer
is in a position to expand to "saturate" the industry with the products
of the invention, either itself or through sublicenses.
In the next case the assumption is made that the total production
of a given industry is highly flexible. The savings per year are much
more variable than the savings per unit. Therefore, it is best to figure
the savings per unit first and derive from it the savings per given length
of time. Suppose we have an article made by an elaborate assembly
of automatic machinery-very little is done by human operation. The
articles are completely prepared, ready to be shipped at a rate of 100
per minute or 6,000 per hour. The material used cost $2.00 for these
6,000 units. Labor to run the machine cost $4.00 and overhead or
fixed charges cost $6.00. The total manufacturing costs, then, amount
to $12.00. Each unit therefore costs one-fifth of a cent ($0.002).
APRIL 1958]
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Assume that the invention doubles the speed of the machine with-
out increasing labor, power or other expenses. The material costs
remain the same, but labor and overhead will be $2.00 and $3.00,
respectively, or a total cost of $7.00 for 6,000 units ($0.001167 per
unit). Saving per unit is $0.002 minus $0.001167 ($0.000833 per
unit, or $0.833 per thousand).
If the inventor enforces the patent he may get a royalty equivalent
to one-third of this saving, or $0.288 per 1,000. If the licensee is to
enforce the patent, the royalty may be one-fifth or less, or a maximum
of $0.167 per 1,000.
Several assumptions have to be made. One is to estimate the
probable total savings throughout the life of the patent. This will
depend on total sales.. Supposing that over a five year period sales
are estimated to be 720,000,000. At $0.83 per 1,000 this means a
total savings of $600,000. A third of this is $200,000. If the indus-
try is highly competitive the litigation costs will be high, say $80,000.
The total which will be left to the inventor is $120,000. If made over a
five year period the inventor would receive yearly payments of $24,000
each. Tabulating these figures we get:
Old Machine.
(a) Production, units per hour 6.000
(b) Material cost per hour $2.00
(c) Labor cost per hour 4.00
(d) Overhead per hour 6.00
(e) Factory cost per hour, or per 6,000 units $12.00
(f) Factory cost per unit, (e) -- (a) 0.002
New Machine
(g) Production units per hour 12,000
(h) Material cost per 6,000 units $2.00
(i) Labor cost per 6,000 units, (e) X (a) -- (g) 2.00
(j) Overhead per 6,000 units, (d) X (a) - (g) 3.00
(k) Factory cost per 6,000 units $7.00
(1) Factory cost per unit, (k) - (a) .001167
(m) Saving per unit, (f) - (1) .000863
(n) Saving per 1,000 units .833
(o) Inventor's share, royalty basis .833
(p) Royalty per 1,000 units, (n) X (o) .288
(q) Effective life of patent, years 5.0
(r) Estimated 5-year sales, thousands of units 720,000
(s) Total saving, (n) X (r) $600,000
(t) Theoretical patent value (o) X (s) 200,000
(u) Estimated cost of litigation 80,000
(v) Actual price of patent, (t) - (u) $120,000
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Product Patents.
With regard to production machinery it is relatively easy to calcu-
late the value of an invention with a fair degree of accuracy, but this is
not so with articles to be made or sold at some future time. This is
because there are very few tangible items to go by.
No manufacturer can afford to utilize an untried invention unless
he is confident it will make him a profit. The burden of proving this
generally rests with the inventor. Estimating the quantity that might
be sold is the most difficult part of determining the value of a product
patent. The best way is to sample the market; try the invention out
in certain areas. It may take some capital to start this venture. If
the patentee doesn't have it he could arrange to have someone make
the product in return for complete profits on the first experimental lot.
He could, of course, negotiate a loan in the more customary manner
if he cannot or wishes not to make a deal of this type.
If a sample lot cannot be made by the inventor he will have to
estimate probable sales. He must estimate how many possible uses
there are for his invention, how many times will a person buy the item,
and how long will they continue to buy it. In arriving at an estimate of
earnings likely to be derived from a patent on an article he must get
answers to these questions: What is the total net cost per unit? What
is the selling price per unit to the wholesale or retail dealers (the factory
price) ? What quantity can be sold? The selling price is the price
at which the manufacturer sells to jobbers or retailers, not the retail
price at which the dealers sell to the public. Payments for patent rights
are based on the selling or factory price.
When the unit labor cost is known, a simple and crude form of
cost estimation is to assume that the unit material cost, overhead, cost
of selling and distribution (selling cost) and patent earnings will each
be equal to the unit labor cost. That is, the factory price of one unit is
divided up as follows:
Labor 20%
Material 20%
Overhead 20%
Selling 20%
Patent earnings 20%
Thus, when the unit material cost is the only cost known, multiply it by
five. Where the unit material and the labor costs are known, total
them and multiply by 2.5.
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If the true costs were known the figures would more than likely
be (in a mechanized industry)
Labor 10%
Material 20%
Overhead 30%
Selling 30%
Patent earnings 10%
Now suppose that the labor cost of a new article was set at $0.42, and
the material cost at $0.55. The direct manufacturing cost is $0.97.
The overhead probably will be 50 or 100 per cent of this cost (or be-
tween $0.48 and $0.97). Say that experience in industry leads to the
conclusion that the overhead would be about $0.80 per unit. This
means that the factory cost will be $1.77. Allowing for selling, profits,
royalties, etc., the factory price will be around $2.95 of which $1.77
is 60 per cent. The remaining 40 per cent, or about $1.18, could be
divided into 30 per cent, or $0.88, for selling, and 10 per cent, or $0.30,
for profit and royalties.
If the inventor is to defend the patent his royalty might be between
$0.06 and $0.10 or between 20 and 33 per cent of the income of $0.09
per unit. Assuming the compromise figure of $0.09 per unit, the
royalty works out to 3 per cent of the factory price.
Note that $2.95 is the factory price, not the retail price. The re-
tailer also has a selling expense of 25 to 50 per cent of the retail price.
In some fields this could be very high. About 10 per cent of the retail
price must be allowed for the retailer's profit. This means that the
factory price will probably be between 40 and 65 per cent of the retail
price.
If the invention has a low retail sales cost, such as a hardware
item, the factory price will be about 65 per cent of the retail price.
100
Thus, - X $2.95 = $4.54. This is the minimum retail price at
65
which the item can be sold, pay all costs and still leave something for
profits and royalties. If royalties were calculated on the retail price
instead of the factory price the rate would be about 2 per cent of the
retail price.
Suppose it is decided to try to sell the article at a much higher
figure than the minimum, say at $7.50. Then the retailer's profit and
selling costs would be 35 per cent of $7.50 or $2.62, leaving a factory
price of $4.88. Of this the direct manufacturing cost will be $0.97, the
[VOL. 3: p. 300
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same as before, leaving $3.91. Since fewer articles will be sold the
overhead per unit will be higher. Let us assume it will be $0.90 per
unit. This leaves $3.01 for the manufacturer's distribution costs, profits
and royalties. If distribution costs are assumed to be 30 per cent of
the factory price, as before, they will be 30 per cent of $4.88 or $1.46.
That leaves $1.55 to be divided between the manufacturer and the
inventor, of which the inventor's 30 per cent nets him $0.47. This
royalty would be 9.5 per cent of the factory price or 6.2 per cent of
the retail price. This would mean that the inventor would get a larger
percentage of royalties but there would be fewer sales and less per
payment to the inventor.
Thus, the retail price would range from $4.80 to $7.50, and the
royalty would vary from 3 to 9.5 per cent of the factory price or 2.0
to 6.2 per cent of the retail price. Nobody can know what the best
selling price is in advance. To find out it may pay to try to get $7.50;
if the item doesn't sell at this price, reduce it gradually until a good
selling level is reached. To allow for these various possibilities, the
rate of royalty is usually a compromise between the top and bottom
estimates. Probably 5 per cent of the factory price is as common a rate
of royalty as any. Tabulating the figures recited above we get:
Minimum Maximum
price price
Labor $0.42 $0.42
Material .55 .55
Direct manufacturing cost .97 .97
Overhead .80 .90
Factory cost 1.77 1.87
Manufacturer's selling cost .88 1.46
Total manufacturing cost 2.65 3.33
Manufacturer's profit .21 1.08
Royalty .09 .47
Factory price 2.95 4.88
Retailer's selling cost and profit 1.55 2.62
Retail price $4.50 $7.50
The above figures, it should be kept in mind, are based upon certain
assumptions:
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1958], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol3/iss3/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
(1) Invention is article with low retail sales cost;
(2) Industry making it is highly mechanized;
(3) Inventor will undertake to enforce the patent; and
(4) Industry is one in which the articles are sold directly by the
manufacturer to the retailer. If any of these conditions is
altered, the calculations must change. For example, if the
article is handled by wholesalers who buy from the factory
and sell to retailers, there will be a greater spread between
the factory and the retail prices. Other factors which may
have a bearing include the effect of competition, the effect of
circumvention and the different effect of basic as compared
to improvement patents.
IV.
KNOW-HOW vs. PATENT RIGHTS.
Is it always preferable to obtain a patent on an invention if it is
possible to do so? Is it better to retain know-how as a trade secret
than to make a necessary disclosure thereof in a patent? Anyone
interested in these questions should be sure to refer to Ridsdale Ellis's
book on Trade Secrets; we will make just a few general observations.
If an inventor wishes to sell his invention, by all means he should try
to obtain a patent first if he can. If the inventor (or his employer)
wishes to practice the invention, primarily, there are some cases where
he may be better off if he does not patent it and tries to maintain it as
a trade secret, but these cases are in the minority and the risks of loss
of the secret are great. Of course, when evaluating the two courses of
action, consideration should be given to the fact that procurement of
a patent is not a guarantee of absolute protection of the invention,
either. Enforcement expenses, the chances of the patent holding up
under litigation, and the financial ability of the patent owner to
protect the patent from attack or dilution are all important factors to
weigh.
V.
FOREIGN PATENTS.
We have just a word or two concerning the value of foreign
patents and situations in which their procurement may or may not be
desirable. There are many references on this subject to which one
could profitably direct his attention, but we shall confine ourselves to
one, the very recent reprint of an excellent talk by John H. Graham
entitled "Footnotes on Foreign Practice," 64 from which Table 3 is
64. 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 623 (1957).
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extracted since it gives some of the more important data concerning
most of the foreign patent laws. Note that most of the commercially
important foreign countries require the payment of taxes on patents
and also that the patents be worked in their jurisdictions. These re-
quirements may, if one has a number of foreign patents in those
countries, amount to a sizeable expense which should be considered in
evaluating the expected benefits to be derived by procuring the patents.
Although the procurement of patents in many foreign countries is
relatively easy because there is no real examination procedure such as
we have in the United States, in countries like Great Britain, Canada,
Germany and Holland the examination can be rigorous and prosecution
may therefore be costly. Furthermore there is the cost of resisting
attack by opposers after the application is allowed and published for
opposition purposes. A good number of the foreign countries have
this feature in their patent laws. Last, but not least, it happens quite
regularly that the secret you hope to keep for two to five or more years,
while your application for patent is being prosecuted before the United
States Patent Office, leaks out within a few short months after you file
in some foreign countries which allow applications promptly and leave
it up to would-be opposers to present evidence against the invention's
patentability. To get the benefit of your filing date in the United States,
you must file in the foreign countries (which are members of the
International Convention Union) within twelve months of that date.
Thus, if one of those countries allows and publishes the application
within, say, six months of filing, your eagle-eyed competitors will know
all about your invention within eighteen months of your filing in the
United States. This may be a necessary risk, but it is one you ought to
keep in mind.
VI.
CONCLUSION.
As said at the outset, the subject of inventors and their relations
with others is a vast one. We have only scratched the surface, but
trust this scratch will not "immunize" you from the subject in the
manner of a vaccine. We hope it will whet your appetite for further
inquiry. As Mitchell Wilson said, in the foreword to his pictorial
history, American Science and Invention: "Nothing is to be taken as
the last and final word, for that will never be written."
65. WILsoN, AMERICAN SCIENCE AND INVENTION (1954).
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